In this collection of essays written after 1992' s Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas identifies hirnself with the neo-Kantian universalist faction of Anglo-American political philosophy. This orientation must constantly be recalled in light of the fact that his explicit aim is to set forth a system in which otherness and diversity are preserved against the unifying mechanisms of Rawlsian and communitarian democracies. Such a project would seem to align closely with contemporary continental philosophy's attempt to think difference and otherness without reducing them to unity. Yet, by situating hirnself within the Anglo-American tradition, excluding the philosophy of difference, and conceiving otherness under the rubric of a universal system, Habermas privileges the unity and universality that he claims to challenge.
Habermas argues that his discursive proceduralism, unlike other AngloAmerican political systems, contains the tools for incorporating multiculturalism and pluralism within a universalistic system. Yet, he does not do nearly enough to express this idea adequately, for he conceives and justifies a putatively non-metaphysical, non-ontotheological system without retlecting on the nature and limits of metaphysics and ontotheology or examining whether his claim that metaphysics and ontotheology have lost their power to ground a moral system collapses the is-ought distinction. However, this problem is potentially corrigible, for he could always tlesh out his inchoate understanding of metaphysics and ontotheology and demonstrate their current inadequacy to ground moral values. But he cannot correct his system' s intrinsic inability to account for difference. Because his system merely recapitulates the ancient philosophical project of thinking difference and multiplicity by subordinating them to unity, it cannot challenge the philosophicallpolitical tradition' s destruction of otherness. Just as Parmenides reduces all difference to the one, Plato includes within the unity of Being the otherness or non-being claimed by the sophist, and Aristotle subverts the radicality of difference by thinking being as a kind of unity through his pros en equivocation, Habermas subordinates multiplicity to unity by imagining a political body dedicated to the inclusion of a nonproblematized, systematic form of difference. Habermas' s political system is dedicated to the relating of the other to unity, as the German title of his collection indicates (Die Einbeziehung des Anderen), despite its claim to think the otherness of the other without subsuming it within the undifferentiated unity of society.
Accordingly, Habermas's first move is to reduce the diversity of his opponents by denying recognition to the radical challenges to universality posed by the philosophies of difference. Though he borrows the language of continental philosophy in referring to inclusion and otherness, he never even mentions Foucault, Derrida, Levinas, Deleuze, Heidegger, or even the first wave of the Frankfurt School, as if their problematizations of the inclusion of otherness were irrelevant or inconsequential. Thus, he asserts that "[wJe can leave this debate [concerning postmodern philosophies of differenceJ aside, since it contributes little to an analysis of struggle for recognition in the democratic constitutional state and virtually nothing to their political resolution," and he dismisses the debates of postmodernity by contrasting them with "more strictly philosophical discourses," such as those of Charles Taylor (214). But rather than attempt the weighty task of proving the political irrelevance of contemporary 'continental' philosophy, he seems to think that referring to Amy Gutmann's embarrassingly simplistic dismissal of deconstruction' s political and logical relevance is sufficient to exclude it from his text (288n.13). The intention is clear: Habermas will not accord any status to political and philosophical demands that are not easily identifiable with the liberal democratic tradition or that place everyday understandings of political theory into question. Hence, his text marginalizes continental philosophy out of existence, claiming without rigorous argument that it is non-philosophical (214), self-refuting, and irrelevant to political questions (288n 13). It would be interesting to hear a comprehensi ve argument supporting these claims, and Habermas may provide that elsewhere, but the absence of the philosophy of difference from these essays in particular is crippling, for it suggests that an unreconstructed otherness cannot be incorporated within his regularized system. But if this is the case, then his project of including othemess as otherness within a universalistic system cannot succeed.
The problem is that in excluding philosophical othemess -i.e. nonanalytic political philosophy -Habermas from the outset eliminates radical difference from the political debate. His refusal to grant recognition to the philosophies of difference allows hirn to regularize the field of political discussion in such a way as to constitute it originally on the basis of unity. Alterity cannot exist in his system, for the other is always and already understood through identity. Thus, by dismissing the reality of a radical othemess, and thinking difference solely in terms of identity, he prevents his discursive proceduralism from accounting for othemess as othemess. As a result, the differences intemal to his system are always and already constituted on the basis of unity. This is evidenced by his limiting the diversity of 'relevant' political discussion to the contrarieties of an AngloAmerican multiculturalism that would abolish political universalism and an Anglo-American communitarianism that would abolish pluralism. Because contrarieties, as Aristotle argues in defining them as one in genus, are founded on unity (the unity on the basis of which their difference is defined; thus, black and white, as contrarieties, can be said to express the maximum of difference only because the unifying substratum of color makes it possible to define this difference with respect to unity), Habermas can express difference only in an inherently ordered fashion. This is exceptionally important to the structure of his political theory, for the fact that he understands difference on the basis of a generic unity (that of the liberal democratic political tradition) allows hirn to refrain from questioning the destabilizing relations between reason and power, or reflecting on liberal democratic presuppositions, such as the nature of reason (259), individuality (42), postmetaphysical conditions (8, 11), subjectivity (79), objectivity, equal accessibility (4), and the absence of coercion (45). What can and cannot be said is determined from the start by Habermas' s refusal to recognize the entire range of discursive practices other than the artificially narrow debates of the Anglo-American 'tradition'. Because his system refuses to acknowledge issues that subvert or bring into question the everyday understandings of Anglo-American political theory, it is always and already defined by its exclusion of philosophical difference. This argument that Habermas' s exclusion of the philosophy of difference defines the terms of his debate is not a merely logical point based upon the inherent relationality of the ancient conception of definition (horismos, definis) as a setting of limits by separating the one from the other. To the contrary, the fact that Habermas begins his prefatory remarks on the text by underlining the irrelevance of postmodernism suggests the force of its challenge to his inclusion of difference. He argues that in determining "the rational content of a morality based on equal respect for everybody and on the universal solidarity and responsibility of each for all" (xxxv), postmodernism has nothing to say.
[The] postmodern SUsplClon of an indiscriminately assimilating and homogenizing universalism [is irrelevant because it] fails to grasp the meaning of this morality and in the heat of controversy obliterates the relational structure of otherness and difference that universalism, properly understood, takes into account. ... a universalism that is highly sensitive to differences ... [such that] [e]qual respect for everyone is not limited to those who are like us; it extends to the person of the other in his or her otherness (xxxv).
Habermas seeks to express a universalism inclusive of a difference or alterity that escapes being reduced to an identity. But his seriousness in accomplishing this project must be questioned, for even as he strives to formulate a universalist morality in such a way as to preserve the otherness of the other, he dismisses the type of philosophy most closely directed to this problem. This deliberate omission of 'postmodern' criticisms of political and philosophical universalism has at least two crucial effects. Habermas' s exclusion of philosophical difference shows the disingenuousness of his claims to include difference and restriets the range of ideas open to question the communitarian and liberal democratic models prevalent in the AngloAmerican tradition. While Habermas says that the norm of equal respect applies to difference as weIl as similarity, he does not extend this to the philosophical challenges of postmodernity and continental philosophy, dismissing them without examination. Thus, even as he seeks to preserve difference and resist totality, he refuses to consider arguments irreducible to liberal democratic and communitarian politics, and this reduces the otherness of the other to the unity of his system. Because the Habermasian system cannot handle the difference that it seeks to incorporate, it is limited to rearranging the pre-formed elements of an unreflective, unitarian liberal democratic politics, and it remains unable even to question the meaning of the supposed supercession (8) GEORGE LAKOFF and MARK JOHNSON New York, Basic Books, 1999, 583p. In this book, Lakoff and Johnson take up the ambi tious task of criticizing the whole of Western philosophy from the point of view of the so-called "second generation cognitive science". Their project is based on three basic convictions: (1) the mind is inherently eITlbodied, (2) thought is mostly unconscious, and (3) abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Part I of the book explains these three basic convictions: it introduces the authors' notions of the embodied mind, the cognitive subconscious, and their theory of metaphor; it also explains their notions of an "embodied truth" which emphasizes the contribution of our body to the production of knowledge. In Part 11, the authors describe themselves to be doing "the cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas". Utilizing a cognitive Iinguistics approach, the authors examine a number of philosophical ideas including time, causation, the mind, the self, and morality. For each of the discussed topics, the strategies and the conclusions are similar -the authors try to show that: (a) the ways we think about these topics are always metaphorical, and there is no consistent, non-metaphorical way to reason about them; (b) a number of metaphors are employed in each case, and some of them are inconsistent with the others; (c) difficulties arise when philosophers start to take these metaphors literally; (d) however, as Iong as these metaphors are not taken Iiterally, they are describing something "real", while the term "real" is to be understood in the pragmatists' sense (see pp. 117 and 109). Part 111 of the work is described as "the cognitive science of philosophy". Building on the results from Part 11, the authors analyze a nUITlber of important theories in Western philosophy by discovering the basic, guiding metaphors which underlie each of them. Theories which the authors examine include Pre-Socratic cosmologies, the Platonic theory of Forms, Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, Kantian deontological ethics, Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and a number of other important theories in philosophy. The authors try to show that all these philosophical theories are constituted by indispensable metaphors, whose structures define the inner logic of these
